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DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY IN A
MISSOURI CHATTEL MORTGAGE
INTRODUCTION
This note deals with the Missouri law on the sufficiency of the
description of the property in a chattel mortgage. The impor-
tance of this particular problem lies in the fact that a recorded
chattel mortgage will not give constructive notice to third per-
sons unless the property mortgaged is adequately described.
Hence, this discussion will center primarily, though not exclu-
sively, upon the adequacy of the recital of descriptive facts
when a third party is involved.
The four principal methods employed in describing a chattel,
other than a description of unique physical characteristics, are
recitals of quantity, ownership, possession and location. The sig-
nificance of each of these factors will be discussed subsequently
under separate topic headings. Various other factors of primary
importance in isolated cases will be dealt with in connection with
the four basic means of identification.
The discussion of this subject will conclude with a brief cover-
age of the problems of misdescription of the property, aiding
and curing defects of description, and the procedural methods
of applying the substantive law.
TESTS FOR DETERMINING SUFFICIENCY
As between the Parties
No definite test has been developed by the Missouri cases for
determining the sufficiency of the description as between the
parties. Vague and general words of description have often
been upheld,' and the rule appears to be that such a description
will cover any property of the mortgagor which could reason-
ably be held to come within the general terms employed.2 The
burden of proving that such property was not intended as secur-
ity would thus be cast upon the mortgagor.3 The rule in other
1. Webb City Furniture Co. v. Herrod, 14 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. App. 1929) ;
Dodson v. Dedman, 61 Mo. App. 209 (1895); Houser v. Andersch, 61 Mo.
App. 15 (1895).
2. First National Bank of Mexico v. Ragsdale, 158 Mo. 668, 59 S.W.
987 (1900).
3. Ibid.
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jurisdictions is that the mortgagee must be able to point out the
property which is the subject matter of his mortgage.4 Regard-
less of which test is used, however, it should not be assumed that
a general description will always be sufficient to create a valid
security as between the parties. A chattel mortgage upon crops
to be subsequently planted, for instance, will have no validity
unless the year in which the crop is to be grown is stated in the
instrument But, as a general rule, the courts will attempt to
ascertain and enforce the intent of the parties,6 when the rights
of third persons have not intervened.
As against Third Parties
When the rights of innocent third parties are involved, the
unexpressed intention of the parties to the original security
transaction is of little consequence. The test then applied is that
the description of the property must be such that a third person,
aided by the reasonable inquiries which the mortgage itself sug-
gests, could identify the property.7 It is therefore evident that
what may be an adequate description of the property as between
the parties is often a very precarious security device against
rights acquired by third persons., To protect the mortgagee
against such adverse intervening rights, an absolutely complete
description of the property subject to the mortgage should be
given. A description of the physical characteristics of the par-
ticular chattel is not of itself adequate. Some reference should
also be made to the quantity, ownership, possession and location
of the property involved.
THE STATEMENT OF QUANTITY
It is evident that a statement of the quantity of the property
mortgaged is a primary requisite to an adequate description.
Such a statement need not be made numerically but may take the
form of a blanket mortgage covering all of the property of a
particular class owned by the mortgagor.9 However, if a mort-
4. 14 C.J.S., Chattel Mortgages, § 57, p. 659 (1939).
5. Barnard State Bank v. Lankford, 11 S.W.2d 1084 (Mo. App. 1928).6. Bank of Mendon v. MelI, 185 Mo. App. 510, 172 S.W. 484 (1915).
7. Stonebraker v. Ford, 81 Mo. 532 (1884); Campbell v. Allen, 38
Mo. App. 27 (1889).
8. Dierling v. Pettit, 140 Mo. App. 88, 119 S.W. 524 (1909).
9. State ex rel. Cochran v. Cooper, 79 Mo. 464 (1883); Schell v. Ransom
Coal & Grain Co., 79 S.W.2d 543 (Mo. App. 1935); Strop v. Hughes, 123
Mo. App. 547, 101 S.W. 146 (1907).
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gage purports to cover all the personal property of the mort-
gagor and then proceeds to name specific items of such property
the ejusdem generis rule will probably be applied. 10 That is to
say, the general words of description will be held applicable to
only property of the same general nature as that more particu-
larly described.1
In cases where a mortgage is given to cover a certain num-
ber of a particular class of goods it is prima facie valid,12 but if
it should subsequently appear that the mortgagor then owned
more of that class of goods than named in the mortgage, the
courts generally hold that no lien has been created on any of
such property as against third persons. 3 However, the discovery
of a greater quantity than named in the mortgage of the same
kind of property does not always vitiate the mortgage. For ex-
ample, it has been decided in other jurisdictions that where the
class of property mortgaged is fungible and the quantity mort-
gaged is to be determined by weighing or measuring, the descrip-
tion in such a case is not defective ;14 and in Missouri it has been
held that the mortgagee may offer proof of extrinsic facts which
would enable a third person to separate the mortgaged property
from similar property retained by the mortgagor and thus vali-
date the description. 5 It must be remembered, however, that
although a statement of the quantity of property mortgaged is
necessary and proper, it is but one of several factors to consider
in passing on the sufficiency of the description.
THE STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP
A recital in a chattel mortgage that the property mortgaged is
owned by the mortgagor would probably seem to the layman to
be useless verbiage. Some courts, however, hold that no pre-
sumption of the mortgagor's ownership of the property mort-
gaged will arise from the mere execution of the mortgage."' The
10. Steinecke v. Uetz, 19 Mo. App. 145 (1885).
11. 1 JONEs, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES § 77, p. 146
(6th ed. 1933).
12. Lafayette County Bank v. Metcalf, 29 Mo. App. 384 (1888).
13. Stonebraker v. Ford, 81 Mo. 532 (1884); Kibble v. Ragland, 263 S.W.
507 (Mo. App. 1924); Klebba v. Missouri Meerschaum Co., 25 S.W. 174
(Mo. App. 1923).
14. 14 C.J.S., Chattel Mortgages § 61, p. 670 (1939).
15. White v. Meideroff, 220 Mo. App. 171, 281 S.W. 101 (1926).
16. First National Bank v. Maxwell, 198 Iowa 813, 200 N.W. 401 (1924).
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
result of such holdings is that since a description lacking any
specification of ownership applies with equal force to any prop-
erty coming within the terms of that description, whether
owned by the mortgagor or not,17 the mortgage will be held too
vague and indefinite to give notice to third parties. Most juris-
dictions, however, allow an inference of ownership by the
mortgagor to be drawn from various recitals in the mortgage.
Thus the otherwise fatal defect of having the mortgage encom-
pass too much is avoided by permitting a finding that the mort-
gage does in fact indicate that only the property owned by the
mortgagor is the subject thereof.
The intermediate appellate cases in Missouri are in conflict
on whether the essential inference can be drawn, and the Su-
preme Court of Missouri has never had the issue before it. The
case of Bozeman v. Fields,18 which held the recital "two iron gray
mares, three and four years old respectively," without a refer-
ence to their ownership being made, too indefinite, has received
contrary interpretations by the appellate courts. In Estes v.
Springer", the Kansas City Court of Appeals decided that the
holding in the Bozeman case was not inconsistent with drawing
an inference of ownership of the property by the mortgagor
from other recitals in the mortgage. Twenty years later the St.
Louis Court of Appeals in Dierling v. Pettit20 held that the prec-
edent established in the Bozeman case was controlling and pre-
cluded the drawing of such an inference although admitting that
it would be logically sound to do so. It is difficult to say just what
the rule is in Missouri in the light of a recent decision by the St.
Louis Court of Appeals.21 It was there said, by way of dictum,
that the rule that such an inference could be drawn was recog-
nized in Dierling v. Pettit (where in fact it was recognized as be-
ing the law in other jurisdictions but nevertheless repudiated),
and that such an inference was permissible.
An argument often advanced in favor of the presumption of
ownership of the property by the mortgagor is that since the
vendor of a chattel impliedly warrants his ownership, the mort-
17. 1 JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES § 54d, p. 103(6th ed. 1933).
18. 44 Mo. App. 432 (1891).
19. 47 Mo. App. 99 (1891).
20. 140 Mo. App. 88, 119 S.W. 524 (1909).
21. Local Finance Co. v. Yantis, 152 S.W.2d 989 (Mo. App. 1941).
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gagor should be presumed to be the owner of the property mort-
gaged. This is not only a false analogy but also a non-sequitur.
The analogy is false because in the case of a vendor of a chattel
the warranty is implied to give to the vendee a right against
the vendor, whereas in the mortgage situation the presumption
would operate to protect the mortgagee against rights asserted
by third persons. And the analogy is a nor-sequitur in that the
very fact that the law implies a warranty of title in a vendor is
in a sense opposed to the presumption that he is the owner of
the chattel.
The argument that the conflict should be resolved in favor of
the presumption of ownership by the mortgagor is more logically
supported by the general policy of the law to presume that acts
are done with lawful authority. If this policy were recognized
and given effect in this situation it should be enough to validate
the presumption.
Another aspect of the general problem of the statement of
ownership arises in the case of a mortgage of crops. Particular
attention should be given to the correct designation of the mort-
gagor's interest in the land upon which the crops are to be
grown. A general statement that a crop is to be grown on land
owned by the mortgagor, which is in fact only leased by him,
may be held misleading and therefore invalid as to third
parties.22
STATEMENT OF POSSESSION
A description of the quantity of property mortgaged, aided
by the presumption of ownership of such property by the mort-
gagor, may still be so general as not to be binding upon third
persons.23 As a general rule it is necessary to ascribe a situs to
the mortgaged property before the description will be held suffi-
cient.2 4 A statement in the mortgage as to who has possession
of the mortgaged property is one method of doing this. A direct
statement as to who has the possession of the property is seldom
made, however; it more often being left to inference from other
recitals in the mortgage. For example, a provision in the instru-
ment that the mortgagor is to retain possession of the property
until default is generally taken as a recital of possession by the
22. Mayor v. Keith, 55 Mo. App. 157 (1893).
23. Dierling v. Pettit, 140 Mo. App. 88, 119 S.W. 524 (1909).
24. Ibid.
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mortgagor. 5 It is also sometimes said that since the mortgagor's
residence is given in the mortgage and the mortgage further
states that the mortgagor is to retain possession of the property
until default, that the locus of the property has been adequately
described.26 That these provisions adequately serve their pri-
mary purpose of enabling the mortgagor to retain the possession
and use of the mortgaged property until default is not denied,
but it is at best a doubtful and indecisive manner of ascribing a
situs to the mortgaged property. It may be argued that such
provisions in the mortgage are made only in reference to a right
retained by the mortgagor rather than to the actual fact of pos-
session of the property by him. But even if it is admitted that
the inference should be drawn that the property was in the pos-
session of the mortgagor at the time of the execution of the mort-
gage, it is piling inference upon inference to say that the prop-
erty has been located by the terms of the mortgage. The most
that can be said is that the mortgage suggests a source of inquiry
as to the location of the property, such source being the mort-
gagor. Thus it might well become a matter of controversy as to
whether a reasonable inquiry would disclose the location of the
property,27 a question of fact upon which juries could well differ.
It would seem that a direct statement as to who had possession of
the property at the time the mortgage is executed would be the
minimum precaution taken by the careful draftsman, even
though the courts will frequently require less. And this proce-
dure is not so much for the purpose of ascribing a situs to the
property as it is to furnish a source of inquiry to which a third
party in search of the property would be directed.
STATEMENT OF THE LOCATION
The single most important factor, in the majority of the cases
which have raised the issue of the sufficiency of the description,
has been the statement of the location of the mortgaged property.
Only one Missouri case has been found which upheld a descrip-
tion where neither the possession nor the location was stated,
and that was a case involving the description of an automobile
by motor and serial number. Such a holding aptly illustrates
25. Shanks v. Tinder, 216 Mo. App. 173 257 S.W. 188 (1924).
26. Estes v. Springer, 47 Mo. App. 99 (1891).
27. Young v. Bank of Princeton, 97 Mo. App. 576, 71 S.W. 713 (1903).
28. Local Finance Co. v. Yantis, 152 S.W.2d 989 (Mo. App. 1941).
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that, important as the element of the location of the property is,
it is merely a factor to be taken into consideration along with
other circumstances in determining the adequacy of the descrip-
tion. As a general rule, however, it may safely be said that a
complete failure to give the location of the property gives the
mortgagee no protection against rights acquired by innocent
third parties. 29
It may be stated as a general proposition that the more vague
the other elements of description become, the more precisely the
location of the property must be set forth.30 Thus where the class
of property is described in general terms not only must the gen-
eral location of the property be given, but it must be sufficiently
limited in area so as to furnish reference points for distinguish-
ing the mortgaged property from other property of that class in
the same general area.3 1 As a corollary principle, it may be
stated that if the location of the property is definitely and pre-
cisely established by the terms of a mortgage, such fact may
validate a description where other usual means of identification
are conspicuously absent.32
When the location of the mortgaged property is not directly
stated in the mortgage the problem of drawing an inference of
the location from other recitals in the mortgage arises. Unlike
the similar problems involved where ownership of the property
is not stated, the Missouri Courts have consistently held that the
location of the property may be inferred from other recitals in
the mortgage.3 3 The most common of such recitals is that pro-
viding for a default if the property is removed from a named
county. A dictum in one case goes so far as to say that the loca-
tion of the property within a certain county may be inferred
from the fact that the mortgage was recorded in that county and
the debt payable there.3 It should be noted that even with the
aid of such an inference the issue remains as to whether locating
the property within a certain county is definite enough to pro-
29. Cummins v. King, 217 Mo. App. 371, 266 S.W. 748 (1924); Hughes
v. Menefee, 29 Mo. App. 192 (1888).
30. Bozeman v. Fields, 44 Mo. App. 432 (1891).
31. Young v. Bank of Princeton, 97 Mo. App. 576, 71 S.W. 713 (1903).
32. Evans-Snyder-Buell Co. v. Turner, 143 Mo. 638, 45 S.W. 654 (1898).
33. Shanks v. Tinder, 216 Mo. App. 173, 257 S.W. 188 (1924); Estes v.
Springer, 47 Mo. App. 99 (1891); Jennings v. Sparkman, 39 Mo. App.
663 (1890).
34. Johnson v. Hutchinson, 81 Mo. App. 299 (1899).
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vide third persons with reasonable means for locating the prop-
erty. Leaving such an issue to the vagaries of a jury is the price
to be paid for careless draftsmanship 5
An interesting problem arises when the parties to the trans-
action contemplate the transfer of the mortgaged property sub-
sequent to the execution of the mortgage. In such a situation it
is often thought better to locate the property at the place to
which it is to be removed. This procedure can be a fatal mistake
if the rights of third persons intervene before the transfer is
made.30 Generally, if only one location is to be given, it should
be the one where the property is the moment the mortgage is
executed. As a practical matter, however, it would probably be
a better practice to give both of the locations together with an
explanation of what is contemplated. If the only location given
is that to which the property is to be removed, the mortgagee
will not be protected against intervening rights until the process
of transfer has begun.38
MISDESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY
Whether a misdescription of the property will invalidate the
mortgage depends upon the tendency of the error to deceive and
mislead third persons.,, The more reliance which would natu-
rally be placed upon the particular misdescription the more likeli-
hood that such a mistake will be fatal. Thus a mortgage describ-
ing cattle as branded with a "--" and a "Z" will not cover
cattle branded with either a "--" or a "Z" and not both.40 Like-
wise, in the case of automobiles, the correct description of the
motor and serial numbers is the controlling factor.41 But where
there are no serial numbers or similar indicia of a unique char-
35. Dierling v. Pettit, 140 Mo. App. 88, 119 S.W. 524 (1909); Young
v. Bank of Princeton, 97 Mo. App. 576, 71 S.W. 713 (1903).
36. J. H. North Furniture Co. v. Davis, 76 Mo. App. 512 (1898);
Mackey v. Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 618 (1895).37. State ex rel. Pope Bros. Moulding Co. v. Althaus, 60 Mo. App. 122(1894).
38. Ibid. Cf. Trower Bros. Co. v. Hamilton, 179 Mo. 205, 77 S.W. 1081(1904).
39. Tootle v. Buckingham, 190 Mo. 183, 88 S.W. 619 (1905); Cook v.Wheeler, 218 S.W. 929 (Mo. App. 1920); City National Bank v. Goodloe-
McClelland Commission Co., 93 Mo. App. 123 (1902); Jones Bros. Livestock
Commission Co. v. Long, 90 Mo. App. 8 (1901).
40. New Hampshire Cattle Co. v. Bilby, 37 Mo. App. 43 (1889).
41. First National Bank of Brookfield v. Gardner, 5 S.W.2d 1115 (Mo.-
App. 1928).
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acter involved, and other elements of the description adequately
describe the property subject to the mortgage, the mere fact
that there is some error in a part of the description vill not
impair its validity. So the mis-statement of the age of cattle
otherwise adequately described will not vitiate the mortgage. 4
And in exceptional cases where the other elements of the descrip-
tion are accurately and precisely set forth they may be of suffi-
cient weight to overcome the misleading effect of an erroneous
statement of the location of the property.4 3
Following the same principle it has been held that an er-
roneous use of technical legal terms is not necessarily fatal to
the description. The use of the term "fixtures," for instance,
did not prevent a mortgage from covering the personal prop-
erty intended by the parties to be the security.44
CURING DEFECTS IN THE DESCRIPTION
The Missouri cases are all in accord that parol evidence may
be used to aid and explain the general language employed in a
description, but not to add terms not found therein.45 Just how
much parol evidence can be used in aid of the description is thus
likely to depend in part upon the breadth of the language em-
ployed. Nevertheless, little advantage can be gained from prov-
ing by parol what could be adequately described in writing and,
therefore, the more particular description would seem to be the
most desirable.
Of course, where the mortgagee secures and retains possession
of the mortgaged goods, an effective common law pledge is cre-
ated, obviating any necessity for a mortgage.46
PROCEDURAL METHODS OF APPLYING THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Whether the description given in a mortgage is such that a
third person, aided by the reasonable inquiries which the mort-
gage itself sugests, could identify the property, is both a ques-
42. Swinney v. Merchant's Bank, 95 Mo. App. 135, 68 S. W. 960 (1902).43. Cook v. Wheeler, 218 S.W. 929 (Mo. App. 1920); City NationalBank v. Goodloe-McClelland Commission Co., 93 Mo. App. 123 (1902).44. State to use of Von Der Ahe v. Cabanne, 14 Mo. App. 455 (1883).45. Bruce v. Karp, 1 S.W.2d 214 (Mo. App. 1928); Bank of AtchisonCounty v. Schachleford, 67 Mo. App. 475 (1896); Chandler v. West 37Mo. App. 631 (1889); Campbell v. Allen, 38 Mo. App. 27 (1889); Bank ofOdessa v. Jenningsk, 18 Mo. App. 651 (1885).46. Dawson v. Cross, 88 Mo. App. 292 (1901); Finke v. Pike, 50 Mo.App. 564 (1892). Cf. Humphrey's Savings Bank v. Carpenter, 213 Mo.App. 390, 250 S.W. 618 (1923).
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tion of law and a question of fact. Thus the proper method of
raising an objection to the sufficiency of the description, in the
first instance, would be to object to its being introduced in evi-
dence41 If the court is of the opinion that reasonable men could
differ as to the adequacy of the description under the above test,
then it becomes a question of fact for the jury.48 If the court
should be of the opinion that the description is valid only in part,
the mortgage will be allowed in evidence to prove the identity
of that portion properly described.49
No definite line of authority has developed as to whether opin-
ion evidence is admissible on the issue of whether a third person
could identify the property from the description given in the
mortgage. One case has held that such evidence is proper, 0
whereas another has decided that such a procedure is of doubtful
propriety.51 It would seem that the latter ruling is preferable
since such opinion testimony does not purport to be that of an
expert and is therefore a direct invasion of the province of the
jury.
CONCLUSION
The careful draftsman with the correct facts at hand should
have little difficulty in drafting an adequate description of the
property covered by a chattel mortgage. In general it may be
said that the Missouri courts have not insisted on superficial
technicalities in the description of the property. The cases gen-
erally indicate that the courts have been rather liberal in con-
struing the description of the property in favor of upholding the
validity of the mortgage. Thus it would seem that a description
of the unique physical characteristics of the particular chattel
involved, together with a direct statement as to the quantity,
ownership, possession and location of the property, would con-
stitute an adequate description in almost every case.
Ross E. MORRIS
47. Hart v. Farmers Bank of Bates County, 28 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. App.
1930).
48. Williamson v. Bank of Curryville, 69 Mo. App. 368 (1897); Bonney
v. Meisenheimer, 61 Mo. App. 434 (1895).
49. Kelvinator St. Louis, Inc. v. Schader, 225 Mo. App. 479, 39 S.W.2d
385 (1931); Meyer Bros. Drug Co. v. Self, 77 Mo. App. 284 (1898).
50. Bruce v. Karp, 1 S.W.2d 214 (Mo. App. 1928).
51. White v. Meiderhoff, 220 Mo. App. 171, 281 S.W. 101 (1926).
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